标签： Homer Morals

A. A. Long 

Source: Journal of Hellenic Studies, vol. 90, 1970, pp. 121-39. 
Irene J. F. De. Jong, Homer: Critical Assessments, New York: Routledge, 1999. 

the notion that modern western man's moral values may be properly distinguished from those of an ancient Greek by reference to Kantian ethics is a highly debatable proposition. (P306)

But my primary purpose is to express strong reservations concerning the philosophical and philological analysis of certain Homeric texts which Adkins offers on the basis of his general 
assumptions. (P306) 

Homeric 'Society', Evaluative Language and Professor Adkins

Before passing to detailed analysis of texts I wish to call in question two of Adkins, general assumptions.

Much of his argument about Homeric values is based on the men and qualities which Homeric society needs most.

• Adkins argues that Homeric values are a product of its needs: the values he has in mind are success in war and peace which are taken to be commended and decried by such words as αρετη and κακοτης :

  'the chieftains must protect their own families and followers.' (P306)

• if we confine attention to the usage of ἀγαθός in Homer and compare this with all the modes of moral judgment which occur in the epics, certain facts do emerge which differ from those presented by Professor Adkins. (P307)

The second assumption of Professor Adkins which I find it necessary to challenge concerns his fundamental division of values into two groups. (P307)

• After asserting that the concept of moral responsibility (in any society) must depend on the general world-view and complex of values he writes:

  • 'in any society there are activities in which success is of paramount importance; in these, commendation or the reverse is reserved for those who in fact succeed or fail.

• On the other hand, in any society there are also those activities, such as contracts or partnerships, in which men co-operate with one another for a common end.
• Since the only basis for co-operation is fairness ... it is in terms of fairness, or some similar word, that the relations of men who co-operate will be estimated.
• Fairness raises questions quite different from those of success or failure.’

He calls the two groups of values 'competitive' and 'co-operative or quiet'. These two categories of values are then applied to the analysis of Homeric texts. (P307)

But I have grave doubts about the appropriateness in principle of attempting to classify 
Homeric ethical terminology under the two exclusive categories of judgment by results (competitive) or judgment in terms of some different criterion like fairness (quiet or co-operative). (P308)

In fact, δικη in Homer is a matter of doing or failing to do certain things (e.g. returning Briseis to Achilles) and fairness has no obvious connexion with the sense or application 
of σαοφρων, πινυτος or πεπνυμενος. (P308)

Competition and? Co-operation

Adkins denies virtually any importance to intentions in Homer, but there are other passages in which some emphasis is placed upon 'trying'. (P309)

The fact that some co-operative activities are seen in terms of τιμή may be relevant to Homer's neglect of intentions, but it does not rob them of the right to be called 'co-operative'. (P310)

It means that certain kinds of co-operation are required by a man's personal status and situation. (P310)

In other words, for Homer Adkins' distinction between competitive and co-operative values proves to be not a categorical distinction between two kinds of judgment, but a distinction between powerful words for commending success or denigrating failure and allegedly weaker words for evaluating results, not intentions, of a different kind. (P311)

The Claims? of Agathos

But in fastening such close attention on this isolated word he makes no allowance for the formulae and ornamental epithets of oral poetry. (P311)

The Application of Words evaluating Action: Excess and Deficiency

To establish the effect of Homeric values upon 'the concept of moral responsibility, Adkins proposes a schema of three sets of words (pp. 45f.).

According to it, we have to distinguish:

(1) words for commendation/denigration in the competitive sphere;

(2) words performing this function in the co-operative or quiet 
sphere; and

(3) words like αἰδώς and ἀεικής which span both spheres. (P314)

I hope to show that there is a link, neglected or denied by Adkins, between the τιμή, competitive standard, and the unfavourable evaluation of certain kinds of aggressive or unco-operative behaviour. (P314)

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