Source: Merit and Responsibility, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1960, pp. 30-60. Irene J. F. De. Jong, Homer: Critical Assessments, New York: Routledge, 1999.
Only an examination of the terms used to decry mistake and moral error and commend the contrary states will reveal the extent to which Homeric society distinguished a category of mistake, and hence the nature of its concept of moral responsibility. (P279)
The noun arete, with the adjective agathos, its synonyms esthlos and chrestos, the comparative formsameinon and beltion, and the superlatives aristos and beltistos, are, as will be demonstrated below, the most powerful words of commendation used of a man both in Homer and in later Greek. (P279)
The noun kakotes, with the adjective kakos, its synonyms deilos and poneros, the comparative formkaklon, and the superlative kakistos, are the corresponding words of denigration. (P279)
Agathos, kakos, and their synonyms are relevant to this discussion in the masculine and feminine forms, since, as they comment on the excellence of human beings, they may claim to be moral terms. The neuter forms agathon and kakon have no such claim. (P279)
B. The Most Important Qualities
(i) The Agathos and his Arete
(Agathos and Arete) they imply the possession by anyone to w h o m they are applied of all the qualities most highly valued at any time by Greek society. (P280)
What is commended by these terms is firstly military prowess, and the skills which promote success in war, together with that success which, as (P280) will be seen, is indistinguishable in Homer from the skills which contribute to it. (P281)
But this is not all.
agathoi and cherees characterize high and low social position respecrively. (P281) This usage is not distinct from the former, but forms part of one world-view.
Agathos commends the most admired type of man; and he is the man who possesses the skills and qualities of the warrior-chieftain in war and, as will be seen, in peace, together with the social advantages which such a chieftain possessed. (p281)
both elenchistos and aischron decry failure in war: and this is the manner in which such failure is regularly treated. In peace, too, the same standards apply. (P281)
This is the range of aischron and elencheie. (P282)
As one would expect, aischron is used in the same class of situations as agathos, since the agathos, when values are stable, is the man who does not do aischra, whatever may be the connotation of the words at any period.
It is aischron to fail, in war or in peace, and entails elencheie, a feeling of shame combined with and resulting from the words and actions which a failure in Homeric society will have to suffer from his fellows, if he does fail, in war or in peace. (P282)
(ii) The Justification of the Arete-standard
If we examine the culture revealed by these terms of value, we discover
a society whose highest commendation is bestowed upon men who must successfully exhibit the qualities of a warrior, but must also be men of wealth and social position;
men, too, who must display their valour both in war and in peace to protect their dependents: a function in which they must succeed, for the most powerful words in the language are used to denigrate those who fail. (P282)
Homeric values, then, are not the result of caprice. (P283)
In war, the failure of one man may well contribute to the failure of his friends: a failure which, in the Homeric world, must result either in slavery or annihilation.
Success is so imperative that only results have any value: intentions are unimportant. (P283)
Thus, Homeric society does value most highly the class it needs most:
men who are well-armed, strong, fleet of foot and skilled in war, counsel, and strategy. Naturally, too, it values most highly in these m e n just those qualities which it recognizes as being essential to the security of society. (p283)
(iii) Women's Arete in the Homeric Poems
The arete of women, not surprisingly, differs from that of men. (P284)
The qualities demanded are beauty, skill in weaving and housekeeping, chastity, and faithfulness.(P284)
(iv) Arete and the Co-operative Excellences
It has already been shown that it is unnecessary for men to possess any of the quiet virtues in order to beagathos. (P284)
Nestor wants to restrain Agamemnon from behaving as he does; Apollo and the other gods would like to pass effective censure upon Achilles. Were there any word of censure strong enough to override the claims of the agathos to do as he pleases, they would surely have used it. But there is no such word: (P285)
society's need of the agathos is too strong. (P285)
(v) Persuasive Definitions in Homer
Penelope is at the end of her tether; and in these circumstances she (or rather the poet) attempts a new use of language, a 'persuasive definition'，which, if accepted, would effectively restrain the suitors. (P286)
It is, however, a more promising persuasive definition than the former one: as later chapters will show, to demonstrate that action in accordance with the quiet virtues is the mark of the truly intelligent man is the best way of inserting these into traditional arete.
Unfortunately, such a demonstration is far beyond the abilities of Homeric society; (P286)
C. Other Terms of Value
Other terms of value, however, seem to offer more hope to the concept of moral responsibility; and though such passages as have already been discussed make it clear that this hope must be illusory, the other terms deserve consideration. (P287)
Such functions are discharged by other words; and accordingly kalon has in Homer no real link with the competitive excellences, from which alone it could draw real power.
Its real weakness is seen in the speech of Eumaeus, quoted above. Eumaeus can maintain that Antinous has said words which are not seemly, ou kala, but he cannot say that Antinous becomes kakos or not esthlos as a result: for being agathos or esthlos, as has been shown, is not affected by such considerations. (P290)
Ou kalon, then, in Homer, since it is not used to decry failure, is not an equivalent of aischron either in usage or in emotive power.
Ou kalon is opposed to agathos in 'quiet', contexts, but is not strong enough to override it: aischronwould be strong enough to override it, but is not so used. (P290)
This use of kalon, then, can have little effect in the last resort. (P291)
There remain aidos and aeikes: but the effect of these upon the concept of moral esponsibility must be small. (P291)
Naturally, to say that this distaste, this aidos, is weaker when the quiet virtues are in question is not to say that it does not exist; (P291)
as soon as a crisis forces the essential framework of values into view, the competitive values are so much more powerful than the co-operative that the situation is not treated in terms of the quiet values at all;
and as it is precisely with such crises that the concept of moral responsibility is concerned, it is evident that such terms as aidos and aeikes, however useful to society in general, cannot affect the development of the concept of moral responsibility, for they are ineffective at the crucial moment. (P291)
D. The Results
(i) The Claims of Society
The nature of the Homeric system of values is now clear.
It is a system based on the competitive standard of a rete, a standard which, while not involving the co-operative excellences at all, gives society a strong claim against the (P291) agathos, but the agathos an equally strong claim against society. (P292)
Both of these claims affect the concept of moral responsibility, as does the sanction which maintains the system. (P292)
(ii) The Agathos and the Sanction of Homeric Society
This sanction is overtly 'what people will say', as is made quite clear when the suitors protest that the disguised Odysseus must not be allowed to attempt to draw the bow which they have failed to draw. (P292)
Here too it is evident that facts are of much less importance than appearances, and hence that intentions are of m u c h less importance than results. (P294)
It is not necessary to suppose, however, that the state of society created that scheme of values which constitutes a shame-culture. (P294)
There is no reason to explain the existence of this system of values, for it springs from what is primitive and primary:
it would be better to say that society is not yet sufficiently well organized to allow the reflection (or coercion) which might produce a different system. (294)
(iii) The Claims of the Agathos
Society's claims against the agathos, then, and the sanction employed to enforce them, both entail that intentions are widely ignored, with the result that moral error and mistake cannot be distinguished. (P294)
If the agathos chooses to make use of his advantage, his fellows may grow angry with him, and attempt to restrain him by force;
but if for any reason they are unable to do this, his claim to act as he pleases in respect of the cooperative excellences is stronger than any claim they can bring against him;
and if he feels that any thwarting of his desires would be failure, the aidos which he feels at not being agathos must be stronger than the aidos which he feels at not being pinutos. (P294)
Such are the implications of the competitive scheme of values. (P296)
Moral responsibility has no place in them;
and the quieter virtues, in which such responsibility has its place, neither have sufficient attraction to gain a hearing nor are backed by sufficient force to compel one. (P296)
The society of the Homeric poems, however much the author m a y imply that the manner of living of the Cyclopes is old-fashioned, inasmuch as each administers justice to his own children and dependents and has nothing to do with his neighbours, is in feeling and in its terms of value, (P297) which help to maintain the sta tu s quo, still much more an agglomeration of individual 'Cyclopean' households than an integrated society. (P298)
'Pollution', so important later, plays no active part in the beliefs of Homeric man. (P298)
Homeric values, however, suit Homeric society, inasmuch as they c o m m e n d those qualities which most evidently secure its existence. (P299)
Life is a matter of skill and courage; hence skill and courage are most highly commended.
Wrong-doing is not admired by those w h o suffer from it; but right-doing, 'quiet' virtue, is less highly admired by society as a whole than skill and courage, for the latter are more evidently needed. (P299)
Indeed, the fact that, when the protection of oneself and one's associates is in question, moral error and mistake are not and cannot be distinguished in many cases, while competitive excellences completely override the quieter moral virtues in cases where they can, sets the most serious problem for moral responsibility in the centuries after Homer. (P300)
The problem on the practical level is clear; and on the theoretical level too there are serious difficulties. (P300)
In Homer, however, and for centuries thereafter, it is the practical difficulties which are the most pressing.
In the attempted solution of these difficulties certain beliefs about the gods which are found already in Homer have their part to play. (P300)
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